Yu-Shun Wang
2006-09-28 17:44:31 UTC
Hi,
The new version (04) of BTNS P&AS is out. Quick links for
diffs:
http://tools.ietf.org/wg/btns/draft-ietf-btns-prob-and-applic/
Summary of changes (04 vs. 03) below. These should address
all remaining issues, and we (the authors) think it's ready
for WGLC.
Please keep in mind that the goal is to describe the problems
and point to other docs for detailed solutions, especially
re: LoF, channel binding, and connection latching. It is not
the goal of this doc to specify or describe solutions in
details.
Sections 3.3 & 4
(1) Reorganized BTNS modes: two tables, with and without CB
(2) Clarify there are three things:
- higher layer auth (sym or asym) - out of scope
- channel binding (must be sym or both ends)
- network layer auth (sym or asym BTNS)
(3) Re-organized Section 4 completely, and re-wrote
the CBB applicability statement, separated from
SAB
Section 5.7 - LoF
(*) The doc specifically does *NOT* specify whether
LoF means accepting unauth credentials or the subsequent
caching. Let's leave it at that. :-)
(1) Removed SSL from discussion
(2) Some clarification, added the table from slides
Section 5.8 - Connection Latching & Hijacking Stuff
(1) New text
(2) Describe the problem of possible connection hijacking
(3) Introduce the notion of connection latching & discuss
the issue re: inter-session credential caching
(4) Somewhat related to channel binding
Thanks,
yushun
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: [anonsec] I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-btns-prob-and-applic-04.txt
Date: Wed, 27 Sep 2006 15:50:01 -0400
From: Internet-Drafts at ietf.org
To: i-d-announce at ietf.org
CC: anonsec at postel.org
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
directories.
This draft is a work item of the Better-Than-Nothing Security Working
Group of the IETF.
Title : Problem and Applicability Statement for Better Than Nothing
Security (BTNS)
Author(s) : J. Touch, et al.
Filename : draft-ietf-btns-prob-and-applic-04.txt
Pages : 26
Date : 2006-9-27
The Internet network security protocol suite, IPsec, consisting of
IKE, ESP, and AH, generally requires authentication via IKE of
network layer entities to bootstrap security. This authentication can
be based on mechanisms such as pre-shared symmetric keys,
certificates and associated asymmetric keys, or the use of Kerberos.
The need to deploy authentication information and its associated
identities to network layer entities can be a significant obstacle to
use of network security. This document explains the rationale for
extending the Internet network security suite to enable use of IPsec
security mechanisms without full IKE authentication. These extensions
are intended to protect communication in a "better than nothing"
(BTNS) fashion. The extensions may be used on their own (Stand Alone
BTNS, or SAB), or may be useful in providing network layer security
that can be authenticated by higher layers in the protocol stack,
called Channel Bound BTNS (CBB). This document also explains
situations in which use of SAB and CBB extensions are appropriate.
A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-btns-prob-and-applic-04.txt
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The new version (04) of BTNS P&AS is out. Quick links for
diffs:
http://tools.ietf.org/wg/btns/draft-ietf-btns-prob-and-applic/
Summary of changes (04 vs. 03) below. These should address
all remaining issues, and we (the authors) think it's ready
for WGLC.
Please keep in mind that the goal is to describe the problems
and point to other docs for detailed solutions, especially
re: LoF, channel binding, and connection latching. It is not
the goal of this doc to specify or describe solutions in
details.
Sections 3.3 & 4
(1) Reorganized BTNS modes: two tables, with and without CB
(2) Clarify there are three things:
- higher layer auth (sym or asym) - out of scope
- channel binding (must be sym or both ends)
- network layer auth (sym or asym BTNS)
(3) Re-organized Section 4 completely, and re-wrote
the CBB applicability statement, separated from
SAB
Section 5.7 - LoF
(*) The doc specifically does *NOT* specify whether
LoF means accepting unauth credentials or the subsequent
caching. Let's leave it at that. :-)
(1) Removed SSL from discussion
(2) Some clarification, added the table from slides
Section 5.8 - Connection Latching & Hijacking Stuff
(1) New text
(2) Describe the problem of possible connection hijacking
(3) Introduce the notion of connection latching & discuss
the issue re: inter-session credential caching
(4) Somewhat related to channel binding
Thanks,
yushun
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: [anonsec] I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-btns-prob-and-applic-04.txt
Date: Wed, 27 Sep 2006 15:50:01 -0400
From: Internet-Drafts at ietf.org
To: i-d-announce at ietf.org
CC: anonsec at postel.org
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
directories.
This draft is a work item of the Better-Than-Nothing Security Working
Group of the IETF.
Title : Problem and Applicability Statement for Better Than Nothing
Security (BTNS)
Author(s) : J. Touch, et al.
Filename : draft-ietf-btns-prob-and-applic-04.txt
Pages : 26
Date : 2006-9-27
The Internet network security protocol suite, IPsec, consisting of
IKE, ESP, and AH, generally requires authentication via IKE of
network layer entities to bootstrap security. This authentication can
be based on mechanisms such as pre-shared symmetric keys,
certificates and associated asymmetric keys, or the use of Kerberos.
The need to deploy authentication information and its associated
identities to network layer entities can be a significant obstacle to
use of network security. This document explains the rationale for
extending the Internet network security suite to enable use of IPsec
security mechanisms without full IKE authentication. These extensions
are intended to protect communication in a "better than nothing"
(BTNS) fashion. The extensions may be used on their own (Stand Alone
BTNS, or SAB), or may be useful in providing network layer security
that can be authenticated by higher layers in the protocol stack,
called Channel Bound BTNS (CBB). This document also explains
situations in which use of SAB and CBB extensions are appropriate.
A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-btns-prob-and-applic-04.txt
To remove yourself from the I-D Announcement list, send a message to
i-d-announce-request at ietf.org with the word unsubscribe in the body of
the message.
You can also visit https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/I-D-announce
to change your subscription settings.
Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the
username "anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After
logging in, type "cd internet-drafts" and then
"get draft-ietf-btns-prob-and-applic-04.txt".
A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt
Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail.
Send a message to:
mailserv at ietf.org.
In the body type:
"FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-btns-prob-and-applic-04.txt".
NOTE: The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in
MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility. To use this
feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE"
command. To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or
a MIME-compliant mail reader. Different MIME-compliant mail readers
exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with
"multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split
up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on
how to manipulate these messages.
Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
Internet-Draft.
-------------- next part --------------
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